El nacionalismo es, por un lado, un fenómeno socialmente muy variado, del que hay que detectar las "convergencias" que dan razón de lo que es. Y, por otro, es un fenómeno confrontado con mucha frecuencia con prejuicios valorativos cargados emocionalmente, que empujan a moldear las definiciones para acomodarlas a ellos.

En este estudio se defiende que la culpabilidad, frente a sus numerosos críticos, es una categoría imprescindible para la ética que se hace cargo de la realidad del mal. Pero, a la vez, se postula que solo se expresa adecuadamente si es vivida por el culpable mirándose en la víctima. Es algo que tienden a ignorar tanto los que la critican como los que la defienden. Cuando, en cambio, se percibe la culpabilidad con esta focalización, todo queda reconfigurado: el centramiento (...) en la subjetividad del que obró mal, el sentimiento de culpa, la relación entre las variables de la culpa, la responsabilidad, el arrepentimiento. Se muestra así que la culpabilidad vivida con autenticidad hace justicia a la víctima y, concomitantemente, es vía de sanación para el victimario. (shrink)

The presentation made by Professor Lie addresses a topic that is crucial not only in the domain of medical ethics, but also in the ethics of the various professions: the autonomy of the subject with which the professions are concerned. In addition, the presentation succeeded in enhancing creativity, particularly with its final proposal: if the demand for autonomy contains a wish to guarantee the patient’s independence and initiative — i.e., the power to decide for himself or herself — there is (...) a possibility that the proper way to foster this power would be to reject an ethics based on autonomy.Can we really dispense with all reference to the principle of autonomy? And would such a decision be liberating? Drawing on the work of Foucault, Professor Lie points in a suggestive direction while at the same time recognizing the need for solid theoretical work before we can find any viable alternative. While I await with great interest the developments that will lead to new models in the physician-patient relationship, my task at present is to respond to the practical and intellectual challenge by suggesting that instead of ignoring the principle of autonomy, we would do better to refine its subtleties, with a view to surpassing the limitations that we tend to run up against when putting it into practice. (shrink)

Siendo Genet un apestado, un expulsado, un maldito de la cultura europea, alguien que en Europa (y no solo en Europa) fue perseguido y encarcelado por sus delitos, alguien que nunca se cansó de aguijonear, maltratar y maldecir la cultura oficial europea, siendo el verdadero crítico de la misma, hemos de concluir que fue la cultura oficial europea la que se alejó, la que le dio la espalda a Genet y, así, a Hegel; y, así, a sí misma. Esta habría (...) sido la verdadera tragedia europea: haber traicionado su propia vocación, su destino, que era seguir el camino que Hegel diseñó. (shrink)

Decidim es una plataforma digital de democracia participativa desarrollada por el Ajuntament de Barcelona. Decidim es, además, un proyecto tecnopolítico que implica multitud de códigos más allá del informático. Distinguimos tres planos analíticos que sirven para conceptualizar de forma holística y sistemática el proyecto Decidim: un plano político, uno tecnopolítico, y un plano técnico. Decidim emerge como ejemplo de lo que denominamos “redes políticas” caracterizadas, frente a las “redes sociales”, por hacer del vínculo político y la construcción de inteligencia y (...) voluntad colectivas el centro de su diseño y estructura. A su vez, la comunidad y los espacios “Metadecidim” operan como dispositivos para la democratización del software de Decidim y de la democracia en red en un sentido más amplio, constituyendo “redes tecnopolíticas”. Estas redes de nueva generación hacen de la plataforma una infraestructura público-común (financiada con dinero público y co-diseñada con la ciudadanía), abierta y libre para la democracia participativa, un proyecto que aspira a servir de dispositivo y modelo para la transformación política en un periodo de crisis de la hegemonía neoliberal. (shrink)

La filosofía ha perdido la garra que tenía desde el siglo XIX. Este proceso conlleva también un desencanto cada vez mayor de un mundo vacío, un mundo que no encuentra su norte, que se ahoga en su propia abundancia. La neoliberización de dicho mundo es la forma que ahora debe ser pensada y combatida también por la filosofía, que puede y debe aportar una reflexión crítica, debe personarse en las barricadas de la lucha actual, que es muy distinta a la (...) forma de lucha del siglo XX. El siglo XXI se abre con nuevas propuestas de todo tipo y la filosofía tendrá que estar muy atenta para no quedarse fuera. Aquí la figura del búho de Minerva es pertinente: sale después de la batalla a dar cuenta de ella, pero también va por delante marcando el camino. Ambas visiones son necesarias. Este libro cumple una doble función: repasa y analiza el impacto que las ideas de los máximos exponentes de la Teoría Crítica ha tenido en la filosofía contemporánea al tiempo que trata de recuperar una mirada que ayude a pensar con esperanza soluciones críticas para el complejo mundo actual. (shrink)

Lejos de los tópicos sobre el llamado "oscurantismo" medieval, la dinámica global socio-cultural de los siglos XI-XIII es de signo inequívocamente humanista, aunque su principal problema reside en conservar la tradición cristiana heredada, actualizándola y finalmente enriqueciéndola con las aportaciones de la ciencia árabe y el pensamiento aristotélico conocido en su esplendor. La creación de la Universidad, la reestructuración de los saberes bajo la guía de la ciencia aristotélica, los conflictos recurrentes por mor de mantener la hegemonía de la teología (...) en la formación del hombre medieval, se entienden mejor vistos desde la básica confrontación de dos concepciones del hombre en cuanto "imagen de Dios", una propendiendo a la sumisión y otra conducente a la autonomía. Entre ambas mediarán las grandes figuras: así Anselmo, Tomás o Escoto lo harán en distintos momentos del proceso y desde supuestos distintos, transmitiéndonos un modelo basado en la complementariedad jerarquizada de ambas perspectivas.Far of the topics about the so called medieval "obscurantism", the global sociocultural dynamic of the XI-XIII centuries is unequivocally humanist, although its main problem consists in conserving the inherited Christian tradition, rejuvenating as well as enriching it with the Arabian science and the aristotelian thought, known in their splendour. The creation of the University, the reconstruction of the knowledges with the guide of the Theology in the education of medieval man, can be better understood, looking at them from the basic confrontation of two conceptions of the man as "image of God": one of them, tending to the submission, and the other one tending to the autonomy. Between both tendencies, the great figures as Anselmo, Thomas or Scot will mediate an agreement. They do it in different moments of the process and from different suppositions. But they all transmit to us a model based in the complementary hierarchization of both perspectives. (shrink)

El prefijo “auto” en autoorganización y autopoiesis se refiere a la existencia de una identidad o agencialidad implicada en el orden, organización o producción de un sistema que se corresponde con el sistema mismo, en contraste con el diseño o la influencia de carácter externo. La autoorganización (AO) estudia la manera en la que los procesos de un sistema alcanzan de forma espontánea un orden u organización complejo, bien como una estructura o patrón emergente, bien como algún tipo de finalidad (...) o identidad autoconstruida. En este trabajo nos ocupamos del concepto de AO en el contexto de la problemática sobre la naturaleza la vida y de los organismos vivientes. Este concepto se elabora en diferentes tradiciones científicas y filosóficas, a partir de su origen en la filosofía kantiana. La cibernética trata de emular la organización de los seres vivos y su teleología mediante la construcción de máquinas; desarrolla una perspectiva centrada en la regulación y en la causalidad mutua entre componentes del sistema. Estos trabajos, a veces complementados con la teoría de sistemas y la teoría de la información, son fundamentales para el desarrollo de la ciencia del siglo XX, especialmente las ciencias computacionales y la biología. Una segunda corriente surge desde la termodinámica de los procesos irreversibles alejados del equilibrio a partir, entre otros, de los trabajos de la escuela de Bruselas, en la que la AO se explora como la formación espontánea de estructuras de orden disipativo. Una tercera tradición, tal vez la más profundamente kantiana, se desarrolla en el contexto de la biología del desarrollo e integra a las dos mencionadas previamente, pues combina aspectos de las dos previas en el desarrollo ontogenético. Podemos decir que cada una de estas concepciones de la AO se relaciona con modelos paradigmáticos diferentes. La noción de autopoiesis (AP), por su parte, fue propuesta en los años 70 por los biólogos chilenos Humberto Maturana y Francisco Varela para explicar la organización individual de los seres vivos como un proceso dinámico que genera una identidad desde las operaciones del sistema (Maturana y Varela 1973). Puede decirse que hereda y reorganiza ideas de la tradición de la AO, especialmente la kantiana y la cibernética, para proponer una teoría biológica alternativa. El enfoque autopoiético concibe el fenómeno de la vida y a los seres vivos de forma muy diferente a la teoría de la evolución o la biología molecular que constituían las líneas de investigación predominantes en la biología de su tiempo. La teoría subraya como propiedad básica de un sistema viviente su autoconstitución dinámica como unidad dotada de identidad a partir de interacciones entre sus componentes. Sin embargo, aquellas propiedades de la vida consideradas primordiales en el enfoque darwiniano, como la reproducción o la evolución, se ven como secundarias, pues requieren de la existencia previa de sistemas autopoiéticos. El objetivo de esta voz es examinar diferentes aspectos que configuran las tradiciones autoorganizativa y autopoiética, en especial las tensiones conceptuales internas que permiten comprender los desafíos a los que se enfrentan ambas en el marco de la filosofía y la teoría de la biología, así como la forma en que sus posiciones e intuiciones contrastan con otras perspectivas en biología. (shrink)

Una de las dificultades de aproximación que ofrece la Inteligencia Artificial es resultado de la falta de textos, manuales introductorios, ya que la mayoría de la literatura son artículos de revistas o compilaciones de éstos. Uno de los méritos de este libro se basa precisamente en que ofrece una visión global de un area de la Inteligencia Artificial tan fundamental como es el de la Representación del Conocimiento. Como apunta el propio autor, se trata de una introducción desde la perspectiva (...) de la Inteligencia Artificial de las cuestiones fundamentales de la representación del conocimiento, aunque en algunos capítulos se discuten también acercamientos desde la psicología cognitiva. Si bien la extensión de las cuestiones puede parecer limitada en muchos casos, esta brevedad queda compensada por la amplitud y lo acertado de las referencias. Cabe señalar que, en realidad, al ámbito de la Representación del Conocimiento es el de la Representación de la Información. (shrink)

En el texto que nos ocupa, Tauber insiste en la necesidad de cultivar habilidades prácticas de carácter moral para que los médicos puedan cumplir su cometido. Su argumento central es que la práctica de la medicina debe concebirse como una interacción entre sujetos y abandonar el modelo actual, que ha reducido esa interacción a una relación entre sujeto y objeto . Tauber considera que dicha reducción es debida a la cientifización de la actividad sanitaria que, primero, observa al enfermo como (...) objeto de estudio neutral e impersonal de una medicina concebida como una ciencia natural, y ulteriormente trata de rescatar al enfermo como sujeto desde la bioética y en el espacio político jurídico, de forma que se le otorgan derechos y deberes, al ser considerado dueño absoluto de sus decisiones por estar esencialmente dotado de una identidad autónoma. Pero este reconocimiento es, en opinión de Tauber, insatisfactorio, porque sucede fuera del contexto de la interacción entre médico y paciente que constituye a la medicina. Por ello, la demanda teórica central de su texto es la reintroducción de la dimensión moral en la propia práctica médica, transformando el modelo del conocimiento médico mediante una epistemología moral. (shrink)

EI objetivo de este artículo es analizar ciertas críticas a la aplicación de la nocion de informacíon en biología, teniendo en cuenta tanto la historia del concepto como las diferentes posiciones actuales. Creemos que la motivacíon principal de las críticas es negar que los genes sean un factor causal excepcional en el desarrollo, y favorecer la imagen de la vida como un sistema organizado que requiere diferentes recursos. Aunque compartimos el rechazo deI reduccionismo genetico, argumentamos que éste no es atribuible (...) a la analogía informacional y que, por tanto, no es necesario abandonarla completamente.The goal of this article is to analize certain criticisms to the notion of information in biology, taking into account both the history of the concept and some recent positions. We think that the main motivation behind the criticisms is to deny that genes are an exceptional cause in development, and to favor an image of life as an organized system that requires diffirent resources. While we share the rejection of genetic reductionism, we argue that it is not entirely due to the informational analogy and that, therefore, it is not necessary to abandon this analogy. (shrink)

This year we celebrate Raimon Panikkar’s centenary; one of the most important Spanish thinkers and, undoubtedly, one of those who had the widest international repercussion, together with the other three big philosophers of the 20th century: Unamuno, Ortega and Zubiri. The present work explores the relationship between his thinking and Xabier Zubiri’s, a well-known thinker in the History of Spanish Philosophy, and that of Amor Ruibal, a Galician thinker not so wellknown outside specialized circles. This connection among the three (...) thinkers lies particularly in a conception of reality marked by the relation, reaching its culmination in the Catalan-Hindu thinker: The cosmotheandric perspective of Raimon Panikkar, Zubiri’s respectivity and radical relativity, and the ontological relativity or universal correlationism of Amor Ruibal. (shrink)

Living agency is subject to a normative dimension (good-bad, adaptive-maladaptive) that is absent from other types of interaction. We review current and historical attempts to naturalize normativity from an organism-centered perspective, identifying two central problems and their solution: (1) How to define the topology of the viability space so as to include a sense of gradation that permits reversible failure, and (2) how to relate both the processes that establish norms and those that result in norm-following behavior. We present a (...) minimal metabolic system that is coupled to a gradient-climbing chemotactic mechanism. Studying the relationship between metabolic dynamics and environmental resource conditions, we identify an emergent viable region and a precarious region where the system tends to die unless environmental conditions change. We introduce the concept of normative field as the change of environmental conditions required to bring the system back to its viable region. Norm-following, or normative action, is defined as the course of behavior whose effect is positively correlated with the normative field. We close with a discussion of the limitations and extensions of our model and some final reflections on the nature of norms and teleology in agency. (shrink)

The concept of agency is of crucial importance in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, and it is often used as an intuitive and rather uncontroversial term, in contrast to more abstract and theoretically heavy-weighted terms like “intentionality”, “rationality” or “mind”. However, most of the available definitions of agency are either too loose or unspecific to allow for a progressive scientific program. They implicitly and unproblematically assume the features that characterize agents, thus obscuring the full potential and challenge of modeling agency. (...) We identify three conditions that a system must meet in order to be considered as a genuine agent: a) a system must define its own individuality, b) it must be the active source of activity in its environment (interactionalasymmetry) and c) it must regulate this activity in relation to certain norms (normativity). We find that even minimal forms of proto-celular systems can already provide a paradigmatic example of genuine agency. By abstracting away some specific details of minimal models of living agency we define the kind of organization that is capable to meet the required conditions for agency (which is not restricted to living organisms). On this basis, we define agency as an autonomous organization that adaptively regulates its coupling with its environment and contributes to sustaining itself as a consequence. We find that spatiality and temporality are the two fundamental domains in which agency spans at different scales. We conclude by giving an outlook to the road that lies ahead in the pursuit to understand, model and synthesis agents. (shrink)

The concept of “autonomy”, once at the core of the original enactivist proposal in The Embodied Mind, is nowadays ignored or neglected by some of the most prominent contemporary enactivists approaches. Theories of autonomy, however, come to fill a theoretical gap that sensorimotor accounts of cognition cannot ignore: they provide a naturalized account of normativity and the resources to ground the identity of a cognitive subject in its specific mode of organization. There are, however, good reasons for the contemporary neglect (...) of autonomy as a relevant concept for enactivism. On the one hand, the concept of autonomy has too often been assimilated into autopoiesis and the implications are not always clear for a dynamical sensorimotor approach to cognitive science. On the other hand, the foundational enactivist proposal displays a metaphysical tension between the concept of operational closure, deployed as constitutive, and that of structural coupling ; making it hard to reconcile with the claim that experience is sensorimotorly constituted. This tension is particularly apparent when Varela et al. propose Bittorio as a model of the operational closure of the nervous system as it fails to satisfy the required conditions for a sensorimotor constitution of experience. It is, however, possible to solve these problems by re-considering autonomy at the level of sensorimotor neurodynamics. Two recent robotic simulation models are used for this task, illustrating the notion of strong sensorimotor dependency of neurodynamic patterns, and their networked intertwinement. The concept of habit is proposed as an enactivist building block for cognitive theorizing, re-conceptualizing mental life as a habit ecology, tied within an agent’s behaviour generating mechanism in coordination with its environment. Norms can be naturalized in terms of dynamic, interactively self-sustaining, coherentism. This conception of autonomous sensorimotor agency is put in contrast with those enactive approaches that reject autonomy or neglect the theoretical resources it has to offer for the project of naturalizing minds. (shrink)

The notion of information processing has dominated the study of the mind for over six decades. However, before the advent of cognitivism, one of the most prominent theoretical ideas was that of Habit. This is a concept with a rich and complex history, which is again starting to awaken interest, following recent embodied, enactive critiques of computationalist frameworks. We offer here a very brief history of the concept of habit in the form of a genealogical network-map. This serves to provide (...) an overview of the richness of this notion and as a guide for further re-appraisal. We identify 77 thinkers and their influences, and group them into seven schools of thought. Two major trends can be distinguished. One is the associationist trend, starting with the work of Locke and Hume, developed by Hartley, Bain, and Mill to be later absorbed into behaviorism through pioneering animal psychologists (Morgan and Thorndike). This tradition conceived of habits atomistically and as automatisms (a conception later debunked by cognitivism). Another historical trend we have called organicism inherits the legacy of Aristotle and develops along German idealism, French spiritualism, pragmatism, and phenomenology. It feeds into the work of continental psychologists in the early 20th century, influencing important figures such as Merleau-Ponty, Piaget, and Gibson. But it has not yet been taken up by mainstream cognitive neuroscience and psychology. Habits, in this tradition, are seen as ecological, self-organizing structures that relate to a web of predispositions and plastic dependencies both in the agent and in the environment. In addition, they are not conceptualized in opposition to rational, volitional processes, but as transversing a continuum from reflective to embodied intentionality. These are properties that make habit a particularly attractive idea for embodied, enactive perspectives, which can now re-evaluate it in light of dynamical systems theory and complexity research. (shrink)

In this article, we propose some fundamental requirements for the appearance of adaptivity. We argue that a basic metabolic organization, taken in its minimal sense, may provide the conceptual framework for naturalizing the origin of teleology and normative functionality as it appears in living systems. However, adaptivity also requires the emergence of a regulatory subsystem, which implies a certain form of dynamic decoupling within a globally integrated, autonomous system. Thus, we analyze several forms of minimal adaptivity, including the special case (...) of motility. We go on to explain how an open-ended complexity growth of motility-based adaptive agency, namely, behavior, requires the appearance of the nervous system. Finally, we discuss some implications of these ideas for embodied robotics. (shrink)

Dynamicism has provided cognitive science with important tools to understand some aspects of “how cognitive agents work” but the issue of “what makes something cognitive” has not been sufficiently addressed yet, and, we argue, the former will never be complete without the later. Behavioristic characterizations of cognitive properties are criticized in favor of an organizational approach focused on the internal dynamic relationships that constitute cognitive systems. A definition of cognition as adaptive-autonomy in the embodied and situated neurodynamic domain is provided: (...) the compensatory regulation of a web of stability dependencies between sensorimotor structures, is created and preserved during a historical/developmental process. We highlight the functional role of emotional embodiment: internal bioregulatory processes coupled to the formation and adaptive regulation of neurodynamic autonomy. Finally, we discuss a “minimally cognitive behavior program” in evolutionary simulation modelling suggesting that much is to be learned from a complementary “minimally cognitive organization program”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. This paper contemplates Organicism and its relation with molecular and evolutionary biology. We explore whether twentieth-first century biology is returning to positions held at the beginning of the twentieth century and then abandoned. The guiding line is a history of theoretical biology in which we distinguish three periods: 1. The 20s-30s, and the Theoretical Biology Club (Needham, Woodger, and Waddington, among others); 2. An intermediate period in the 60s-70s, in which, in spite of the eclosion of the molecular and (...) evolutionary biologies, there is some recovery of organicist positions, and 3. The present post-genomic situation, which is demanding a systemic approach. (shrink)

Both the irreducible complexity of biological phenomena and the aim of a universalized biology (life-as-it-could-be) have lead to a deep methodological shift in the study of life; represented by the appearance of ALife, with its claim that computational modelling is the main tool for studying the general principles of biological phenomenology. However this methodological shift implies important questions concerning the aesthetic, engineering and specially the epistemological status of computational models in scientific research: halfway between the well established categories of theory (...) and experiment. ALife models become powerful epistemic artefacts allowing the simulation of emergent phenomena, the interaction between different levels of organization and the integration of different causal factors in the very same manipulable object. The use of computational models in ALife can be classified in four main categories depending on their position between theoretical and empirical practices: generic, conceptual, functional and mechanistic. For each of these categories we analyse their epistemic value and select paradigmatic examples that illustrate how ALife models can be fruitfully inserted in the study of life. (shrink)

Jorge Mpodozis presents natural drift as an organism-centered view of biological evolution. Currently, many other research programs in biology and philosophy of biology pursue organismic perspectives in evolution. We consider some of the features appearing in the article in this light in order to highlight what is special in Mpodozis’s proposal. We contend that collaborations among research programs would be valuable and suggest that the major contribution of natural drift for organismic projects lies in its dynamic organizational features.

When Susan Sontag addresses the problem of pornography and relates it to Hegel, she is not merely describing a path in European philosophy aimed to construct a new language, but she is also committing this aim to the importance of re-reading culture. The fashion in which pornography describes reality is meaningful when we are trying to approach Hegel in his aim to construct a post-religious language that finally will make ready-to-hand life as life. Politics, and society, being two essential elements (...) to understand reality, become singularly interesting when analyzed through the gaze of Sontag in combination of Hegel’s philosophy. The conservative morals that reign over what we understand as pornography, and the cultural moment of Europe since the most progressive moments of the 19 th century, describe a fatalist landscape for the future of society and politics. Yet, the learnings from Hegel remain meaningful. In this paper I examine how a post-religious philosophy, aimed long ago by Hegel’s contribution to philosophy, can serve to the understanding of a post-pornographic society: a society that is able to learn from the contributions of Frankfurt’s school with regards to an efficient cultural tissue, and defeat the old religious morals that are inserted in the backbone of politics and philosophy still today. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, se examinan y discuten dos argumentos con consecuencias reduccionistas debidos a Jaegwon Kim y a Theodore Sider respectivamente. De acuerdo con el argumento de Kim, la superveniencia fuerte implicaría la coexistencia necesaria de propiedades (es decir, tal y como normalmente se interpreta, la reducción). De acuerdo con el de Sider, ocurriría lo mismo con la superveniencia global. Uno y otro hacen un uso esencial de sendas nociones de propiedad maximal, las cuales son discutidas aquí a la (...) luz de una interpretación natural e interesante de la teoría de las propiedades implícita en sus argumentos. Bajo esta nueva interpretación, en términos modelo-teóricos (véase apartado 4), obtenemos diversas posibilidades de relaciones formales entre las tesis de superveniencia y la reducción, según la lógica utilizada. Al menos bajo una interpretación interesante, los argumentos de Kim y Sider no son correctos, quedando demos-trado así que dichos argumentos no son válidos en general. We discuss and analyze two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider respectively. According to the first one, strong supervenience would imply necessary coextension of properties (i.e., reduction). According to the second, this would be also the case of global supervenience. Kim and Sider make essential use of their respective notions of maximal properties, which we analyze here in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties. Under this interpretation, in terms of model theory (see § 4), we obtain different possibilities of formal relations between the superveniencie theses and reduction, depending on the logic we use. Under at least one interesting interpretation, the arguments of Kim and Sider are not correct and we become the conclusion that these arguments are not valid in general. (shrink)

Tanto el transhumanismo como el posthumanismo filosófico han prestado una atención especial a la corporalidad humana en relación al avance tecnológico. En el presente artículo, se comienza señalando cómo ambos movimientos difieren significativamente respecto a la herencia del humanismo. Posteriormente, se aborda la noción transhumanista de la ‘libertad morfológica’ de la mano de More, Sandberg y Bostrom. A continuación, se presentan casos paradigmáticos de modificaciones corporales mediante implantes cibernéticos. En último lugar, se problematizan las cuestiones de la identidad, la corporalidad (...) y el desencuentro entre ambas corrientes respecto al ‘volcado de la mente’. (shrink)

In this paper we examine aspects of Canguilhem’s philosophy of biology, concerning the knowledge of life and its consequences on science and vitalism. His concept of life stems from the idea of a living individual, endowed with creative subjectivity and norms, a Kantian view which “disconcerts logic”. In contrast, two different approaches ground naturalistic perspectives to explore the logic of life and the logic of the living individual in the 1970s. Although Canguilhem is closer to the second, there are divergences; (...) for example, unlike them, he does not dismiss vitalism, often referring to it in his work and even at times describing himself as a vitalist. The reason may lie in their different views of science. (shrink)

There are many different kinds of model and scientists do all kind of things with them. This diversity of model type and model use is a good thing for science. Indeed, it is crucial especially for the biological and cognitive sciences, which have to solve many different problems at many different scales, ranging from the most concrete of the structural details of a DNA molecule to the most abstract and generic principles of self-organization in networks. Getting a grip (or more (...) likely many separate grips) on this range of topics calls for a teeming forest of techniques, including many different modeling techniques. Barbara Webb’s target article strikes us as a proposal for clear-cutting the forest. We think clear-cutting here would be as good for science as it is for non-metaphorical forests. Our argument for this is primarily a recitation of a few of the ways that diversity has been useful. Recently, looking at the actual practice of artificial life modelers, one of us distinguished four uses of simulation models classified in terms of the position the models take up between theory and data (see Figure 1). The classification is not exhaustive, and the barriers between kinds are not absolute. Rather, the purpose of the taxonomy is to open up the view for an epistemic ecology of modeling practices. First, and closest to the empirical domain, there are mechanistic models, in which there is an almost one-to-one correspondence between variables in the model and observables in the target system and its environment. Webb’s.. (shrink)

This monographic issue contains a long article bringing together the Lullius Lectures delivered by Professor Sandra Mitchell during the Xth Conference of the Society of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science in Spain, that took place in Salamanca (16-19 November, 2021). The publication of her Lectures is complemented by six original articles that address and examine different aspects of Sandra Mitchell’s contributions to the philosophy of science. In this introduction to the monograph, the editors present the broad outlines of the (...) Lullius Lectures given by Mitchell on the landscape of integrative pluralism. We accompany this overview with a review of some of the fundamental concepts of her philosophy as reviewed and discussed by the original articles included in the monograph on integrative pluralism (Deulofeu & Suárez, 2023; and Van Der Merwe, 2023), emergence (Onnis, 2023), scientific laws (Andersen, 2023; and Plutynski, 2023), and realism (Bertolaso & Sterpetti, 2023). (shrink)

We offer a critical review of the concept of neural information, as received within mainstream neuroscience from Artificial Intelligence. This conception of information is constructed as a conditional probability of a stimulus given a certain neural activation, a correlation that cannot be accessed by the organism and fails to explain its causal organization. We reconstruct an alternative conception of neural information: a pattern of signals that is selected by the organism (as an autonomous system) to contribute to its self-maintenance in (...) virtue of its correlation with external conditions, a correlation that might further be evaluated by the very system. (shrink)

El presente documento aborda el tema enunciado en el título de manera general; ofrece los principios de un tratado más externo, que habrá de hacerse estudiando mejor las aportaciones de las Escrituras y de la tradición cristiana. Sin embargo, más que un estudio abstracto, lo importante es el estudio de la vida, del compromiso de amor y gracia, en el Espíritu de Cristo.

This Open Access book explains the philosophy, design principles, and community organization of Decidim and provides essential insights into how the platform works. Decidim is the world leading digital infrastructure for participatory democracy, built entirely and collaboratively as free software, and used by more than 500 institutions with over three million users worldwide. -/- The platform allows any organization (government, association, university, NGO, neighbourhood, or cooperative) to support multitudinous processes of participatory democracy. In a context dominated by corporate-owned digital platforms, (...) in the era of increasing social structuring via Artificial Intelligence, Decidim stands as a public or community owned platform for collective human intelligence. Yet, the project is much more than its technological features. Decidim is in itself a crossroad of the various dimensions of the networked society, a detailed practical map of its complexities and conflicts. Theauthors distinguish three general dimensions of the project: (1) the political - shedding light on the democratic model that Decidim promotes and its impact on public policies and organizations, (2) the technopolitical - explaining how this technology is democratically designed and managed to produce and protect certain political effects, and (3) the technical - presenting the conditions of production, operation, and success of the project. This book systematically covers those three levels in an academically sound, technologically consistent, and politically innovative manner. Serving as a useful resource and handbook for the use of Decidim, it will not only appeal to students and scholars interested in participatory and digital democracy but also to professionals, policy-makers, and a wider audience interested in learning more about the Decidim platform. (shrink)